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The ability to increase positive attitudes toward the usage of simple actuarial tools by presenting 
educational information regarding the benefits of such tools (i.e., accurate and efficient) was 
assessed. Using a 2 (Accuracy Information vs. No Accuracy Information) X 2 (Efficiency 
Information vs. No Efficiency Information) between-participants design, participants were 
presented with details of a simple actuarial decision making tool in either a medical scenario 
(Study 1; N = 404) or a legal scenario (Study 2; N = 325), and asked to report their attitudes 
toward the tool. Results from both studies showed that informing people of the benefits of simple 
actuarial tools led to increases in levels of satisfaction and willingness to adopt the tools, as well 
as increased ratings regarding the fairness and ethicalness of the tools. The initial acceptance of 
the tool and relative impact of the type of educational information, however, did differ across the 
two scenarios. Implications for the implementation of simple actuarial tools in real world 
decision making contexts are discussed.   
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What You Should Want from Your Professional: The Impact of Education on Peoples’ Attitudes 
Toward Simple Actuarial Tools 
Professionals within a variety of real-world domains must make consequential predictive 
decisions (e.g., doctors diagnosing patients’ medical conditions, psychologists determining 
patients’ likelihood of harming themselves). Given the importance of these types of decisions, 
and the time and resource constraints present in many decision contexts, the ability of 
professionals to make accurate and efficient decisions within these settings is vital. Extensive 
research established that using simple actuarial decision making tools – which use only the 
information shown to be predictive and combine the information using objective rules – can 
allow professionals to make quick and accurate decisions (Grove, Zald, Lebow, Snitz, & Nelson, 
2000). Despite the utility of simple actuarial tools, however, professionals have been hesitant to 
rely upon them when making decisions (e.g., Vrieze & Grove, 2009). One potential reason for 
this hesitancy is the distrust of simple actuarial tools by those affected by the decision outcome 
(Eastwood, Snook, & Luther, 2012). The purpose of the current study was to assess whether 
providing people with information regarding the accuracy and efficiency of simple actuarial tools 
would increase the acceptance of these approaches. 
Regardless of the exact situational context, the process of arriving at a decision involves 
two steps: (1) determining what information to collect and include in the decision calculation and 
(2) determining the manner in which to combine this information to arrive at a final decision. 
With regards to the first step, the traditional viewpoint has been that all available information 
should be collected and included in the decision making process in order to ensure an optimal 
outcome (see Gigerenzer, Todd, & the ABC Research Group, 1999). However, not all available 
information in a given decision context is predictive, and therefore accurate decisions can be 
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made by ignoring non-predictive information and basing the decision only on the information 
that is actually related to the decision outcome (see Dawes, Faust, & Meehl, 1989; Grove et al., 
2000). Furthermore, various time and resource constraints under which many real-world 
decisions are made means that collecting and integrating large amounts of information is often 
unfeasible (e.g., police officer faced with an armed suspect; see Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996).  
With regards to the second step in the decision making process, information that is 
collected can be combined using one of two approaches – in mechanical fashion through the use 
of systematic decision rules or in human-based fashion through the use of professionals’ intuition 
and experience (Dawes et al., 1989). Over the past eight decades, the superiority of the 
mechanical, or actuarial, approach in producing accurate prediction decisions has been 
demonstrated conclusively across a variety of contexts. In an initial review of the area, Meehl 
(1954) showed that, across 20 studies, actuarial methods either equalled or outperformed human-
based methods in terms of prediction accuracy. In a more recent summary of the literature 
comparing the two approaches on predictive accuracy, Grove et al. (2000) found that of the 136 
studies included in their meta-analysis, 63 (46%) favoured mechanical prediction, 65 (48%) 
showed equal performance, and 8 (6%) favoured human-based prediction. Taken together, extant 
research suggests that the most accurate and efficient method of making decisions is to use a 
mechanical approach that includes only the information shown to be predictive (i.e., simple 
actuarial tools). 
In recognition of the potential usefulness of simple actuarial tools, they have been 
developed and integrated in many real-world contexts – often in the form of computerized 
decision aids. These tools are created by using statistical techniques to identify the information 
that is truly predictive – and the relative predictive power of each piece of information – in a 
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given decision context (e.g., Goldman et al., 1996; Quinsey, Harris, Rice, & Cormier, 1998).  
Such computerized clinical support systems have been created to assist physicians in diagnosing 
a variety of medical conditions ranging from abdominal pain to acute chest pain (Garg et al., 
2005). Similarly, in the psychological domain, a number of simple actuarial risk assessment 
instruments have been created to assist clinicians in predicting the future behaviour of offenders 
(e.g., Violence Risk Appraisal Guide, Iterative Classification Tree; Scott & Resnick, 2006). The 
usage of such tools not only allow professionals to make more accurate decisions (see Garg et 
al., 2005), but given their automated nature and focus on only predictive information, to make 
quicker decisions as well (e.g., Bogusevicius, Maleckas, Pundzius, & Skaudickas, 2002). By 
allowing quicker and more accurate decisions, implementing simple actuarial tools would 
arguably lead to important practical improvements in many decision contexts (e.g., save 
resources through reduced inappropriate hospital admissions and parole denials, save lives by 
increased correct diagnosis of serious medical conditions and identification of truly violent 
offenders; see Dawes et al., 1989, Wolf, 2014).  
Despite the demonstrated efficacy of simple actuarial tools and positive implications of 
their usage, professionals in many decision making contexts appear hesitant to utilize them. For 
example, a survey of 183 clinical psychologists revealed that only 31% of respondents reported 
using a mechanical method to integrate data when making clinical assessment decisions (Vrieze 
& Grove, 2009). Similarly, a survey of 830 psychologists working within U.S. correctional 
facilities found that few participants mentioned using actuarial tools when conducting 
assessments of offender risk (Boothby & Clements, 2000). Within the medical domain, Corey 
and Merenstein (1987) found that physicians used an actuarial instrument for predicting heart 
disease to diagnose only 3% of eligible patients, despite the instrument having a high level of 
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predictive accuracy (also see Sieck & Arkes, 2005, for similar results in experimental settings). 
A number of reasons have been suggested for this observed hesitancy, including the fact that 
professionals: (a) may be overly confident in their ability to outperform actuarial tools; (b) feel 
that a standardized tool cannot account for the unique features of individual people; (c) may not 
be aware of the research illustrating the accuracy of actuarial tools; (d) may not feel a suitable 
tool exists for their decision making context; or (e) feel that an actuarial approach is 
dehumanizing (Dawes et al., 1989; Kleinmuntz, 1990; Vrieze & Grove, 2009).  
Several recent studies suggested that an additional reason for the lack of integration of 
simple actuarial tools is the distrust of such an approach by the recipients of decision outcomes. 
With relation to how people want information combined to make consequential decisions, 
Promberger and Baron (2006) found that people faced with a mock medical paradigm were more 
willing to follow and trust medical recommendations (i.e., proceed with surgical procedure) that 
came from a physician as opposed to those provided by a computer program. Similarly, Arkes, 
Shaffer, and Medow (2007) found that participants considered doctors who relied on an actuarial 
decision aid to have lower diagnostic ability than doctors who used their experience and 
intuition. In a follow-up study, Shaffer, Probst, Merkle, Arkes, and Medow (2013) found that 
participants had more negative views of doctors who relied on computerized decision aids 
compared to doctors who sought advice from an external human expert. Most recently, Wolf 
(2014) presented the same mock medical scenarios as used in Arkes et al. (2007) to IT students 
and found that participants rated the diagnostic ability of doctors who relied on a computerized 
decision aid lower than doctors who made unaided decisions. Outside of the medical context, 
business students have also been found to rely more on advice from a human expert rather than a 
statistical method when predicting stock prices (Önkal, Goodwin, Thomson, Gönül, & Pollock, 
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2009). Taken together, the clear message from these studies is that people are hesitant to have 
decisions made about them that are based on actuarial tools, and that they have negative attitudes 
toward professionals that choose to rely on such tools when making decisions.     
It appears that only one study has examined attitudes toward both the information to be 
included in the decision and the way it is combined to arrive at a final decision (Eastwood, et al., 
2012). Using legal (i.e., bail decision), medical (i.e., drug prescription decision), and academic 
(i.e., scholarship decision) scenarios, participants were provided with four different decision 
making approaches that varied according to (a) whether all or only some of the available 
information was included in the decision and (b) whether the information was combined 
intuitively using the professional’s experience or by using a computer-based statistical formula. 
Across three samples, a clear preference emerged for intuitive-based approaches that included all 
of the available information (labelled the “human-is-better” and “more-is-better” effects, 
respectively). By contrast, the simple actuarial approach was rated consistently as the least 
preferred option, and was also seen as less accurate, fair, and ethical compared to the human-
based approach that considered all possible information. These results suggest that the decision 
making approach that is arguably the most effective (i.e., simple actuarial) is also the approach 
that people are least favourable towards.  
Although previous research attempted to explore variables that impact peoples’ 
willingness to utilize simple actuarial tools (e.g., witnessing an algorithm make decision errors, 
Dietvorst, Simmons, & Massey, 2015; also see Arkes, Dawes, & Christensen, 1986; Goodwin, 
2000), no studies to-date have tried to reduce directly the aforementioned resistance to simple 
actuarial approaches. The purpose of the current study was to assess whether providing 
information regarding the aforementioned advantages of simple actuarial tools would be 
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effective in changing the current negative attitudes toward their usage. Research has shown that 
educational information can lead to attitude change, particularly if it includes strong arguments 
with compelling and falsifiable facts (Angst & Agarwal, 2009), uses positively framed 
arguments (i.e., focused on gains and beneficial outcomes; Jones, Sinclair, & Courneya, 2003; 
O’Keefe, 1990), and highlights the potential consequences of an issue (Wood, 2000). In addition, 
people are more likely to attend to, and be persuaded by, strong arguments and when the issue is 
personally relevant (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986).  
In Study 1, a medical decision making scenario related to the prediction of heart attacks 
in emergency room patients was used, and in Study 2, a legal decision making scenario related to 
predicting future violence in inmates eligible for parole was used. These decision contexts were 
chosen because (a) they produce decision outcomes that could potentially impact most members 
of the general public and therefore would be of interest to them, and (b) previously constructed 
simple actuarial decision tools that were empirically demonstrated to be accurate and efficient 
exist in these contexts (Goldman et al., 1996; Quinsey, et al., 1998). In terms of the educational 
information, passages of text were constructed that stated clearly how the simple actuarial tool 
was more accurate and efficient, as well as the positive practical consequences associated with 
adopting simple actuarial tools within each of the two contexts. Based on the aforementioned 
research, it is hypothesized that participants that do not receive educational information would 
have negative attitudes toward simple actuarial tools. It was also hypothesized that the addition 
of each type of educational information (i.e., accurate, efficient) regarding the benefits of the 
tools would each independently increase positive attitudes toward the tools.    
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Study 1 
Method 
Sample. Participants (N = 404) were adults from across the United States of America. Of 
the participants who reported their gender, there were 180 men (Mage = 45.29, SD = 14.87, Range 
= 18-77) and 220 women (Mage = 45.66, SD = 16.11, Range = 20-81). There were 335 (82.92%) 
Whites, 27 (6.68%) from Multiple Races, 19 (4.70%) Asians, 11 (2.72%) Blacks, 6 (1.49%) 
Hispanics, 5 (1.24%) Native Americans, and 1 (0.25%) participant did not report ethnicity. Two 
participants (0.50%) had less than a high school degree, 47 (11.63%) had a high school degree or 
equivalent, 102 (25.25%) had some college but no degree, 34 (8.42%) had an associate degree, 
110 (27.23%) had a bachelor degree, 107 (26.49%) had a graduate degree, and 2 (0.50%) 
participants did not report education levels. In terms of annual household income, 114 
participants (28.22%) reported earning less than $50,000, 144 (35.64%) reported between 
$50,000 and $99,999, 54 (13.37%) reported between $100,000 and $149,999, 41 (10.15%) 
reported over $150,000, and 51(12.62%) did not provide household income. 
Materials and Design. A medical scenario involving the diagnosis of chest pain in 
emergency room patients was used in the current study (see Appendix A for wording of the 
scenario). Participants were presented with the current procedure in which an emergency room 
doctor obtained and assessed up to 50 pieces of information from each patient and used their 
experience and training to categorize the patient’s risk for having a heart attack. The final 
treatment decision was based on the doctor’s categorization of risk. Participants were then 
presented with a new procedure in which 5 pieces of information from each patient were entered 
in a computer-based statistical program and the formula calculated the patient’s risk for having a 
heart attack. The final treatment decision was based on the formula’s categorization of risk. The 
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details of the cues included in both procedures were taken from Goldman et al.’s (1996) 
development of an actual simple actuarial decision making tool for classifying patients 
complaining of acute chest pain. Information regarding the higher accuracy and the efficiency of 
the new approach, and specific practical implications of increased accuracy and efficiency, was 
outlined (see below). 
Accuracy Information 
Researchers had the statistical formula and doctors categorize thousands of past patients with 
severe chest pain. Their decisions were then compared to actual patient outcomes. Results 
showed that the statistical formula produced significantly more accurate categorization 
decisions than doctors. By being more accurate, the new categorization procedure will save lives 
by more precisely identifying patients who will actually have a heart attack. It will also save 
money by avoiding giving unnecessary treatments to patients who will not have a heart attack. 
Efficiency Information 
Researchers have collected extensive medical information from thousands of past patients with 
severe chest pain. This information was then analyzed statistically and compared to actual 
patient outcomes. Results showed that only the 5 pieces of information included in the above 
formula were needed to make accurate risk categorization decisions. By requiring less 
information, the new categorization procedure will save lives by diagnosing patients more 
quickly. It will also save money by requiring less medical tests and examinations to be 
conducted.  
A 2 (Accuracy Information vs. No Accuracy Information) X 2 (Efficiency Information 
vs. No Efficiency Information) between participants-design was used. A survey consisting of 6 
separate pages was constructed using SurveyMonkey (https://www.surveymonkey.com). The 
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first page consisted of a consent form. The second page consisted of instructions regarding how 
to complete the survey. The third page contained demographic questions. The fourth page 
contained the medical decision making scenario outlined above and, depending on the condition, 
did or did not contain the information regarding the accuracy and efficiency of the new decision 
making procedure. The fifth page asked the participants to rate, using a 7-point scale, their 
satisfaction with the new procedure, as well rate the new procedure on its perceived fairness and 
ethicalness. Participants were also asked to indicate whether or not they would support the 
implementation of the new decision making procedure at their local hospital, and to record in as 
much detail as possible their reasoning for their answers to the above questions. The sixth page 
contained a debriefing form with further details about the purpose of the study.   
Procedure. Participants were collected using SurveyMonkey’s audience feature. 
Potential participants were contacted via email regarding an opportunity to complete a 
questionnaire in the SurveyMonkey system, and provided a link to access the questionnaire. 
Upon completion of the survey, SurveyMonkey donated 50 cents to a charity of the participants’ 
choice. Participants did not receive direct compensation for participating in the study.1 
Coding open-ended responses. Participant’s responses to the open-ended question at the 
end of the survey were coded by the first author. A grounded approach to categorizing written 
text was used, whereby variables were derived through iterative refinement and the coding 
dictionary was modified until it reflected the content of responses across all participants (see 
House, Eastwood, & Snook, 2009 for an example of this approach). This process resulted in a 
total of 13 unique variables.2 A research assistant, blind to the purpose of the study, also coded 
each participant’s open-ended answer. The mean Kappa value for the coding of the open-ended 
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responses was 0.63 (Percentage Agreement = 94%), suggesting substantial agreement between 
the two coders (Fleiss, 1981; Landis & Koch, 1977). 
Confidence Intervals (CIs) and Effect Size calculations. As practical rather than 
statistical significance (Kirk, 1996) was of primary concern in this research, the use of 95% 
Confidence Intervals (CIs) and effect sizes (i.e., Cohen’s d; Cohen, 1988) were emphasized for 
the presentation and interpretation of results. For the purpose of this analysis, CIs were 
interpreted as containing a range of plausible values for the population mean, while values 
outside the CI are relatively implausible (Cumming & Finch, 2005). In relation to significance 
testing when comparing CIs of two different means, when CIs do not overlap (or barely touch), 
then p < .01 (Cumming & Finch, 2005; Schenker & Gentleman, 2001). Effect sizes were 
interpreted using Cohen’s (1988) guidelines for small (d = 0.20), medium (d = 0.50) and large (d 
= 0.80) effects.  
Results  
A 2 (Accuracy Information vs. No Accuracy Information) x 2 (Efficiency Information vs. 
No Efficiency Information) analysis of variance was computed on participants’ overall 
satisfaction score. The ANOVA revealed only a significant main effect of Efficiency 
Information, F(1, 400) = 10.23, p = .001, with greater satisfaction for conditions that contained 
Efficiency Information (M = 5.23, SD = 1.53) than for those that did not (M = 4.72, SD = 1.70, d 
= .32). There was no main effect of Accuracy Information, F(1, 400) = 1.39, p = .239. The 
average satisfaction scores of conditions that did and did not contain Accuracy Information were 
5.08 (SD = 1.66) and 4.88 (SD = 1.60), respectively (d = 0.12). The interaction did not reach 
significance.  
SIMPLE ACTUARIAL TOOLS  13 
The average satisfaction score (out of 7), and associated 95% CI, for each of the four 
conditions is shown in Figure 1. As can be seen, the highest level of satisfaction was observed 
when both information components (i.e., accuracy, efficiency) were present (M = 5.24, SD = 
1.62, CI = 4.93, 5.55) and the lowest level of satisfaction was observed when none of the 
information components were present (M = 4.54, SD = 1.70, CI = 4.20, 4.88). The CI for the 
satisfaction scores of the No Information condition also did not overlap with the CIs for 
satisfaction scores of the Efficiency Information (d = 0.43) or Both Information conditions (d = 
0.42).  
A 2 (Accuracy Information vs. No Accuracy Information) x 2 (Efficiency Information vs. 
No Efficiency Information) ANOVA was also computed on the remaining two dependent 
measures. Participants in the Accuracy Information conditions rated the simple actuarial 
approach as more fair (F(1, 400) = 3.98, p = .047, d = .20) and ethical (F(1, 400) = 4.15, p = 
.042, d = .21) than those in the No Accuracy Information conditions. Similarly, participants in 
the Efficiency Information conditions rated the simple actuarial approach as more fair (F(1, 400) 
= 4.23, p = .040, d = .21) and ethical (F(1, 400) = 7.74, p = .006, d = .28) than those in the No 
Efficiency Information conditions. None of the interactions reached significance. 
The average fair and ethical ratings (out of 7), and associated 95% CIs, for each of the 
four conditions are also shown in Figure 1. As can be seen, the highest ratings were observed 
when both information components were present (fairness: M = 5.23, SD = 1.48, CI = 4.95, 5.51; 
ethicalness: M = 5.20, SD = 1.57, CI = 4.90, 5.50) and the lowest ratings were observed when 
none of the information components were present (fairness: M = 4.62, SD = 1.64, CI = 4.30, 
4.94; ethicalness: M = 4.41, SD = 1.69, CI = 4.08, 4.74). The CIs for the scores of the No 
SIMPLE ACTUARIAL TOOLS  14 
Information condition also did not overlap with the CIs for scores of the Both Information 
condition for the ethical (d = 0.48) measure.  
The ratings of willingness to adopt the simple actuarial tool in their local hospital are 
shown in Figure 2. There was no significant difference between participant’s willingness to 
adopt the simple actuarial tool as a function of condition, 2 (3, N = 404) = 6.94, p = .074. As can 
be seen, at least two thirds of participants in all conditions were in favour of adopting the new 
approach. Participants in the Both Information condition (81.31%, CI = 72.89%, 87.56%) were 
the most willing to adopt the simple actuarial tool, while those in the No Information condition 
were the least willing to adopt (66.00%, CI = 66.28%, 74.54%), with only a small overlap in CIs 
between the two conditions. There was substantial overlap in CIs between the three information 
conditions.  
A total of 306 participants (75.74%) participants provided an open-ended response 
explaining the rationale behind their answers (note that only variables mentioned by over 5% of 
respondents are reported here). The most commonly mentioned factor was the efficient nature of 
the simple actuarial approach (n = 100; 32.68%). This was followed by the need for human 
involvement in the decision process (n = 61; 19.93%), improved patient outcomes with the 
simple actuarial approach (n = 58; 18.95%), the need for more information to be included in the 
simple actuarial formula (n = 43; 14.05%), and the increased accuracy of the simple actuarial 
approach (n = 32; 10.46%). Less commonly mentioned factors were the need for quick decisions 
when assessing chest pain (n = 28; 9.15%), the need for human experience and intuition in the 
decision process (n = 27; 8.82%), the need for the simple actuarial formula to consider unique 
aspects of each patient (n = 24; 7.84%), and using the simple actuarial tool as just an additional 
input considered by a human decision maker (n = 21; 6.86%). 
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Discussion 
The purpose of Study 1 was to measure the impact of educational information on 
attitudes toward a simple actuarial tool in a medical decision making context. Contrary to the 
first prediction, and in contrast to previous research measuring attitudes toward actuarial tools, 
participants were generally positive about the simple actuarial tool. For example, two-thirds of 
the people in the control condition – who received no educational information – reported being 
in favour of adopting the tool in their local hospital. There are several potential explanations for 
this somewhat surprising finding. First, given the increased usage of technology within hospital 
settings (e.g., MRI machines, EEGs, ultrasound), people may be more comfortable with 
computers being involved in medical decision making. Second, given that the survey was 
conducted online, the sample may simply have been more comfortable with technology than 
samples in past studies. However, this explanation seems less likely given that previous research 
has shown that IT students (Wolf, 2014) and those with a positive attitude toward statistics 
(Shaffer et al., 2013) were less accepting of diagnoses from physicians who used computerized 
decision aids. Third, people may have a positive view of the simple actuarial tool because the 
current scenario only mentioned that the formula was “more accurate” and no indication of its 
actual error rate or specific past incorrect decisions were presented – past research has shown 
that peoples’ confidence in the actuarial approach will be lowered when they see the algorithm 
err (see Dietvorst et al., 2015).  
A fourth, and arguably most likely explanation, is that the increased acceptance was a 
result of the scenario used. Specifically, the medical situation (i.e., diagnosing severe chest pain) 
was one in which the ability to make a rapid decision was of primary importance. This is in 
contrast to previous studies in which the diagnostic situation did not require an urgent decision 
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(e.g., injured ankle, sore throat). Even without educational information, participants could easily 
deduce that the simple actuarial tool’s reliance on less information and automated decision 
making would lead to much quicker decisions than the human-based and information-intensive 
approach – which is supported by the high efficiency rating given to the tool regardless of 
condition. This explanation also appears to match the reasoning given by many participants in 
their open-ended responses, as the most commonly mentioned rationale for supporting the simple 
actuarial tool was its ability to make quick and efficient decisions.  
In line with the second prediction, it was found that making people aware of the specific 
benefits of a simple actuarial medical diagnostic tool led to more positive attitudes toward the 
tool. The effect sizes between the No Information and Both Information conditions were all 
positive and ranged from d = 0.39 to d = 0.48 (average d = 0.43), while the CIs for the means of 
these two conditions did not overlap for two of the three dependent measures (i.e., satisfaction 
and ethicalness). These results suggest a true but relatively small impact of education 
information on attitudes toward simple actuarial tools. However, it should also be noted that a 
15% increase in willingness to adopt the tool locally (i.e., 81% vs. 66%) between the two 
conditions represents an important practically significant difference. It is likely that the 
unexpectedly high positive attitudes in the No Information condition limited the ability of the 
information to change attitudes more strongly, and the impact of educational informational may 
be larger in contexts where people are naturally less accepting of simple actuarial tools.  
Although both accuracy and efficiency information led to increased positive attitudes, it 
appears that efficiency information was somewhat more persuasive. Similar to the explanation 
for the increased acceptance of actuarial tools generally, the increased influence of efficiency 
information may be due to the time-sensitive nature of the scenario used in Study 1. That is, 
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participants may have been influenced strongly by information regarding the ability of the simple 
actuarial tool to make quick decisions and the specific benefits of quicker decisions in this 
context (i.e., identify who is at high risk for heart attack). This explanation is supported by the 
fact that almost 10% of the respondents explicitly mentioned in their open-ended responses the 
need to make quick decisions in this scenario.   
 Overall, the findings from Study 1 suggest that although educational information may be 




Sample. Participants (N = 325) were adults from across the United States of America. Of 
the participants who reported their gender, there were 102 men (Mage = 50.55, SD = 15.91, Range 
= 19-87) and 221 women (Mage = 42.68, SD = 17.45, Range = 19-83). There were 268 (82.46%) 
Whites, 21 (6.46%) Blacks, 17 (5.23%) from Multiple Races, 6 (1.85%) Hispanics, 6 (1.85%) 
Native Americans, 2 (0.62%) Asians, and 5 participants (1.54%) did not report ethnicity. One 
participant (0.31%) had less than a high school degree, 27 (8.31%) had a high school degree or 
equivalent, 83 (25.54%) had some college but no degree, 34 (10.46%) had an associate degree, 
101 (31.08%) had a bachelor degree, 78 (24.00%) had a graduate degree, and 1 (0.31%) 
participant did not report education levels. In terms of annual household income, 107 participants 
(32.92%) reported earning less than $50,000, 101 (31.08%) reported between $50,000 and 
$99,999, 46 (14.15%) reported between $100,000 and $149,999, 31 (9.54%) reported over 
$150,000, and 40 (12.31%) declined to answer. 
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Materials and Design. A legal scenario involving the prediction of future violence in 
inmates applying for parole was used in the current study (see Appendix B for wording of the 
scenario). Participants were presented with the current procedure in which a prison psychologist 
assessed up to 120 pieces of information from each inmate and used their experience and training 
to categorize the inmate’s risk for engaging in future violence. The final parole decision was 
based on the psychologist’s categorization of risk. Participants were then presented with a new 
procedure in which 12 pieces of information were entered in a computer-based statistical 
program and the formula calculated the inmate’s risk for engaging in future violence. The final 
parole decision was based on the formula’s categorization of risk. The details of the cues 
included in both procedures were adapted from Quinsey et al.’s (1998) and Steadman et al.’s 
(2000) development of simple actuarial tools for making risk assessment decisions. Information 
regarding the higher accuracy and the efficiency of the new approach, and specific practical 
implications of the accuracy and efficiency, was outlined (see below). 
Accuracy Information 
Researchers had the statistical formula and psychologists categorize thousands of past inmates 
applying for parole. Their decisions were then compared to actual inmate outcomes. Results 
showed that the statistical formula produced significantly more accurate categorization 
decisions than psychologists. By being more accurate, the new categorization procedure will 
save lives by more precisely identifying inmates who will actually engage in violence if released 
and thus keep them in prison. It will also save tax payers’ money by avoiding keeping inmates in 
jail who would not engage in violence if released. 
Efficiency Information 
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Researchers have collected extensive information from thousands of past inmates applying for 
parole. This information was then analyzed statistically and compared to actual inmate 
outcomes. Results showed that only the 12 pieces of information included in the above formula 
were needed to make accurate risk categorization decisions. By requiring less information, the 
new categorization procedure will save time by categorizing inmates more quickly. It will also 
save tax payers’ money by requiring less information to be collected by prison staff.  
The same survey design as outlined in Study 1 was used in Study 2, with the exception of 
the change to a parole decision making scenario and asking whether or not they would support 
the implementation of the new decision making procedure at a prison in their state.  
Procedure. The same procedure as outlined in Study 1 was followed for Study 2, 
including the process of coding open-ended responses. A total of 18 unique variables were 
identified, and the mean Kappa value for the coding of the open-ended responses between the 
first author and the research assistant was 0.65 (Percentage Agreement = 93%), suggesting 
substantial agreement between the two coders (Fleiss, 1981; Landis & Koch, 1977). 
Results 
A 2 (Accuracy Information vs. No Accuracy Information) X 2 (Efficiency Information 
vs. No Efficiency Information) analysis of variance was computed on participants’ overall 
satisfaction score. The ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of Accuracy Information, F(1, 
321) = 33.32, p < .001. The average satisfaction scores of conditions that did and did not contain 
Accuracy Information were 4.79 (SD = 1.53) and 3.85 (SD = 1.58), respectively (d = 0.60). 
There was also a significant main effect of Efficiency Information, F(1, 321) = 11.28, p = .001, 
with greater satisfaction for conditions that contained Efficiency Information (M = 4.58, SD = 
1.49) than for those that did not (M = 4.03, SD = 1.72, d = .34). The was also a significant 
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interaction effect, F(1, 321) = 6.42, p = .012, where the effect of Efficiency Information was 
much larger when Accuracy Information was not present than when it was present.  
The average satisfaction score (out of 7), and associated 95% CIs, for each of the four 
conditions is shown in Figure 3. As can be seen, the highest level of satisfaction was achieved 
when both information components were present (M = 4.86, SD = 1.52, CI = 4.93, 5.19) and the 
lowest level of satisfaction was achieved when none of the information components were present 
(M = 3.32, SD = 1.60, CI = 2.95, 3.69). The CI for the satisfaction scores of the No Information 
condition did not overlap with the CIs for satisfaction scores of the Accuracy Information (d = 
0.89), Efficiency Information (d = 0.65), or Both Information (d = 0.99) conditions. 
A 2 (Accuracy Information vs. No Accuracy Information) X 2 (Efficiency Information 
vs. No Efficiency Information) ANOVA was also computed on the remaining two dependent 
measures. Participants in the in the Accuracy Information conditions rated the simple actuarial 
approach as more fair (F(1, 321) = 21.87, p < .001, d = .49) and ethical (F(1, 321) = 21.29, p < 
.001, d = .50) than those in the No Accuracy Information conditions. Participants in the 
Efficiency Information conditions rated the simple actuarial approach as more fair (F(1, 321) = 
4.24, p = .040, d = .21) compared to those in the no Efficiency Information conditions, while 
there was no effect for ratings of ethicalness, F(1, 321) = .92, p = .339, d = .10. There was also a 
significant interaction effect for ratings of fairness (F(1, 321) = 7.55, p = .006) and ethicalness 
(F(1, 321) = 5.24, p = .023) – in both cases the effect of Efficiency Information was larger when 
Accuracy Information was not present than when it was present.  
The average fair and ethical ratings (out of 7), and associated 95% CIs, for each of the 
four conditions are also shown in Figure 3. As can be seen, the highest ratings were observed 
when only accuracy information was provided (fairness: M = 4.97, SD = 1.53, CI = 4.63, 5.31; 
SIMPLE ACTUARIAL TOOLS  21 
ethicalness: M = 4.78, SD = 1.53, CI = 4.44, 5.12) and the lowest ratings were observed when 
none of the information components were present (fairness: M = 3.71, SD = 1.66, CI = 3.34, 
4.08; ethicalness: M = 3.57, SD = 1.68, CI = 3.19, 3.95). The results also show that the CIs for 
the scores of the No Information condition did not overlap with the CIs for the scores of the Both 
Information condition for the measures of fairness (d = 0.73) and ethicalness (d = 0.59).  
The ratings of willingness to adopt the simple actuarial tool in their local prison are 
shown in Figure 2. There was a significant statistical difference between participant’s 
willingness to adopt the simple actuarial tool as a function of condition, χ2 (3, N = 352) = 30.67, 
p <.001. As can be seen, participants in Accuracy Information condition (71.79%, CI = 60.97%, 
80.57%) were the most willing to adopt the simple actuarial tool, while participants in the No 
Information condition (30.26%, CI = 21.09%, 41.33%) were the least willing to adopt the tool. 
There was a high degree of CI overlap between the three Information conditions, however the CI 
for the No Information condition did not overlap with the CIs for the other three conditions.  
A total of 277 of the participants (85.23%) provided an open-ended response explaining 
the rationale behind their answers (note that only variables mentioned by over 5% of respondents 
are reported here). The most commonly mentioned factor was the need for human involvement 
in the decision process (n = 102; 36.82%, see Figure 2).  This was followed by the efficient 
nature of the simple actuarial approach (n = 62; 22.38%), the need for the simple actuarial 
formula to consider unique aspects of each inmate (n = 43; 15.52%), the need for more 
information to be included in the simple actuarial formula (n = 42; 15.16%), using the simple 
actuarial tool as just an additional input considered by a human decision maker (n = 34; 12.27%), 
the unbiased nature of the simple actuarial tool (10.83%), and the need for human experience and 
intuition in the decision process (n  = 28; 10.11%). Less commonly mentioned factors were the 
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increased accuracy of the simple actuarial approach (n = 27; 9.75%), concerns about the integrity 
of the computerized system (e.g., viruses, inaccurate entry of data; n = 22; 7.94%), and the desire 
for more research on the validity of the simple actuarial approach (n = 20; 7.22%). 
Discussion 
Consistent with the first prediction, participants who did not receive educational 
information had negative attitudes toward the simple actuarial tool. Specifically, less than a third 
of participants in the No Information condition were in favour of adopting the parole procedure 
in their local prison, and rated the simple actuarial tool lower across the dependent measures. 
This finding is consistent with past research showing that people have negative attitudes towards 
the use of simple actuarial tools in legal contexts (Eastwood et al., 2012).  
Consistent with the second prediction, both types of information (i.e., accuracy and 
efficiency) led to increases in positive attitudes towards the simple actuarial tool. The effect sizes 
between the No Information and Both Information conditions were all positive and ranged from 
d = 0.59 to d = 0.99 (average d = 0.77), while the CIs for the means of these two conditions did 
not overlap for all three dependent measures (i.e., satisfaction, fair, ethical). These results 
suggest a true and relatively large impact of education information on attitudes toward simple 
actuarial tools. Furthermore, the willingness to adopt the procedure in a local state prison more 
than doubled (i.e., 30% to 64%) when both types of information were presented to participants.  
The results also showed that accuracy information led to larger effect sizes across the 
dependent measures compared to efficiency information (average d = 0.53 and d = 0.22, 
respectively). In addition, the condition in which only accuracy information was provided 
produced the highest percentage of participants willing to adopt the simple actuarial tool locally. 
This increased effect of accuracy information may be because participants were less concerned 
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about the need to make quick decisions and more focused on ensuring that correct decisions were 
made (i.e., violent offenders were not released). This explanation is reinforced by the results of 
the analyses of participants’ open-ended responses, as many participants referred to the inability 
of computer to accurately consider the unique aspects of complex human behaviour and the need 
to have a human involved in the decision process to ensure accurate decisions were made, while 
no participants mentioned the need for quick decisions to be made in this scenario. Furthermore, 
in the conditions in which accuracy information was not provided, 46% of respondents reported 
a desire to have human oversight of the decision process, compared to only 27% of respondents 
in the conditions where accuracy information was provided – further suggesting that as accuracy 
concerns were allayed, participants became more accepting of the simple actuarial tool.   
 The findings from Study 2 further suggest that making people aware of the advantages of 
simple actuarial tools – and the accompanying practical benefits – will reduce resistance to their 
implementation greatly.  
General Discussion 
Past research has shown consistently that people hold negative attitudes toward simple 
actuarial tools and those who use them, and instead prefer decisions be made intuitively using all 
available information (i.e., “more-is-better” and “human-is-better” effects). These negative 
attitudes toward simple actuarial tools persist despite research showing that such tools lead to 
much more accurate and efficient decisions, which in turn may lead to many practical benefits in 
real-world situations (e.g., more efficient and accurate medical diagnoses and recidivism 
predictions). The purpose of the current experiments was to determine if providing people with 
education regarding the benefits of simple actuarial tools would increase their attitudes towards 
them. Across two different decision making scenarios (i.e., medical and legal), providing people 
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with information regarding the practical benefits of simple actuarial tools greatly increased 
positive attitudes toward these tools. Contrary to expectations, however, the expected dislike of 
simple actuarial tools appeared primarily in the legal decision making scenario and the relative 
impact of the type of information differed across scenarios. While researchers should be prudent 
when making comparisons across studies, these results suggest that the effect of educational 
information may be context dependent. Overall, this study suggests that the implementation of 
simple actuarial tools can be facilitated if people are provided with information regarding their 
advantages.   
Providing people with direct statements regarding the increased accuracy and efficiency 
of simple actuarial tools compared to human-based and information-intensive decision making 
approaches – and the resulting practical benefits of these advantages – was effective in 
increasing acceptance of the tools. Not only did satisfaction ratings increase by an average of 
16% between the No Information and Both Information conditions, over 70% of participants in 
Study 1 and Study 2 were in favour of adopting the simple actuarial tool in either the Both 
Information (medical scenario) or Accuracy Information (legal scenario) conditions. This finding 
is in direct contrast to previous research showing that: (a) people consistently rate a simple 
actuarial approach as the least preferred decision making option (e.g., Eastwood et al., 2012); (b) 
are less likely to follow advice from a computer program than a physician (Promberger & Baron, 
2006); and (c) hold a variety of negative attitudes towards professionals who chose to use 
actuarial tools in practice (e.g., Arkes et al., 2007; Shaffer et al., 2013, Wolf, 2014). The current 
study provides support for the idea that the lack of acceptance of simple actuarial tools by the 
general public may be at least partially because of ignorance regarding their advantages. By 
making people aware of this information, acceptance of the tools will likely increase.  
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Along with ratings of satisfaction, providing educational information led to the simple 
actuarial tools being seen generally as more fair and ethical across both studies; a finding that is 
in contrast to research showing that these types of approaches are consistently rated as less fair 
and ethical than human-based and information-intensive approaches (e.g., Eastwood et al., 
2012). The high ratings for fairness and ethicalness also run counter to the argument that 
actuarial tools may be seen as dehumanizing due to their automated nature (see Dawes et al., 
1989). The results of the current study suggest that the reason for the previous lower ratings for 
measures such as fairness and ethicalness were at least partially due to concerns about the 
accuracy and efficiency of simple actuarial tools. By countering these beliefs with educational 
information, people viewed the simple actuarial tools as more ethically appropriate for use in 
practice. The results of the current study further support the conclusion that if people are made 
aware of the accuracy and efficiency of simple actuarial tools, their attitudes toward their usage 
will become more positive.   
Although both types of educational information (i.e., accuracy and efficiency) led to 
increased positive attitudes, their impact did differ across the two scenarios. Specifically, 
efficiency information had a larger impact in the medical scenario, while accuracy information 
appeared to be more persuasive in the legal scenario. In addition, the base rate of satisfaction 
ratings for the simple actuarial tool was much higher in the medical scenario compared to the 
legal scenario. These results suggest that the perception of simple actuarial tools and their 
benefits may be context dependent. As captured in the open-ended responses, the main reason for 
the difference in attitudes appears to be the level of urgency and complexity associated with the 
decision context. The medical scenario involved the need for an immediate decision using risk 
factors that presumably predicted heart attack likelihood consistently across individuals. Thus, a 
SIMPLE ACTUARIAL TOOLS  26 
formulaic system that could quickly categorize patients while maintaining a high level of 
accuracy was viewed relatively positively, even without educational information. By contrast, 
the parole scenario involved no explicit time constraints and the ostensibly more difficult task of 
predicting long-term future human behavior. Given the lack of need for quick decisions in the 
parole scenario, the primary concern was regarding the formula’s ability to deal with the 
complexities of human behavior, and therefore accuracy information was more persuasive. 
Overall this suggest that attitudes toward simple actuarial tools may be relatively high in time-
sensitive and straightforward decision making situations, and that the type of educational 
information provided may need to be tailored to the specific decision context in order to be 
effective.  
The ability of educational information to improve attitudes toward simple actuarial tools 
is consistent with the overall attitude change literature. Specifically, the scenarios were chosen to 
be relatively relevant to participants and they were asked about their willingness to adopt the tool 
in their local hospital or prison in their state, and the educational information provided multiple 
clear and strong arguments regarding the advantages and positive benefits of the tools – all of 
which are likely to lead to strong attitudinal change (see Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). It should be 
noted, however, that approximately 20% (medical scenario) and 35% (legal scenario) of 
participants in the Both Information conditions still did not favour implementation of the tools, 
suggesting that future research is needed to identify ways to further increase attitudes toward 
simple actuarial tools. For instance, future research could examine whether increasing the 
strength of the argument, or highlighting improvements beyond increased accuracy and 
efficiency could improve attitudes toward simple actuarial tools.  
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There are at least five aspects of the current study that may limit its generalizability. First, 
while the scenarios used were chose to maximize relevance to people, they were hypothetical 
scenarios that may not have captured the complexity of real-world decision contexts. Although 
the use of hypothetical scenarios is common in this field (e.g., Eastwood et al., 2012; Promberger 
& Baron, 2006), future research should focus on the impact of educational information in real-
world settings (e.g., conduct a survey in a hospital waiting room). Second, the current research 
only focused on attitude change, and therefore direct conclusions about how such reported 
attitude change may impact actual behaviour cannot be made. Third, because only simple 
actuarial and human-based information intensive conditions were used, it is not possible to tease 
out effects of what information was considered in the decision vs. how the information was 
combined. Future research should attempt to identify the exact locus of the effect. Fourth, the 
exact accuracy and efficiency gains associated with the simple actuarial tool was purposefully 
left vague (e.g., participants were simple told that new approach was “more accurate”). Future 
research should examine whether providing more precise information impacts peoples’ 
acceptance of the tools, as previous research has suggested it may impact usage of decision aids 
(Kaplan, Reneau, & Whitecotton, 2001). Fifth, participants were provided with information 
about how the new decision making approaches were accurate and efficient, along with the 
practical benefits of being more accurate and efficient (e.g., saving lives, being more cost 
effective). The purpose of including both informational aspects was to ensure the manipulation 
was as strong as possible given that this is the first known attempt to directly manipulate 
peoples’ attitudes toward actuarial decision making approaches. Furthermore, from a practical 
perspective this is information that would be available in real-world contexts if practitioners did 
wish to attempt to articulate to clients the reasons why an actuarial approach is preferable. Future 
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research should attempt to further investigate the relative strength of the types of information 
(and perhaps other types of information not considered in these studies as well). 
Practical Implications for Professional Psychological Practice 
In direct predictive decisions, research-based actuarial tools have been shown to 
consistently outperform unaided human-based decision making – including within clinical 
psychological settings (see Grove et al., 2000). However, the actual implementation of these 
tools into professional practice has been relatively limited, and one potential explanation for the 
lack of usage is the hesitation of patients/clients to have decisions made about them using such 
simple actuarial tools. Results from this study suggest that practitioners within clinical 
psychology settings – as compared to other decision making domains – may face increased 
difficulty when attempting to utilize and implement simple actuarial tools. Given the perceived 
increased complexity of predicting future human behaviour, many participants in the control 
condition of the parole scenario reported that statistical formulas could not perform this task 
accurately and that human-based decision making needed to take precedence. 
Despite the initial hesitation, when provided with educational information regarding the 
advantages and benefits of these tools – and in particular their ability to make more accurate 
predictive decisions – attitudes toward them and the willingness to have them adopted in practice 
increased greatly. The positive attitudes suggest that psychological professionals may be able to 
overcome hesitations regarding simple actuarial tools if they take the initiative to explain the 
reason for their usage and their associated benefits. However, the open-ended comments 
suggested that even when convinced of the accuracy of the simple actuarial tool, many 
participants still wanted some level of human oversight – with the actuarial tool acting as an 
important piece of additional piece of information to be considered by a clinician. Although this 
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hybrid approach may appear a reasonable solution, caution must be taken as less accurate 
decisions may be made due to the inability of human decision makers to identify consistently 
when they should deviate from the formula’s prediction (Dawes et al., 1989; Whitecotton, 
Sanders, & Norris, 1998; Zacharakis & Sheppard). Practically speaking, however, people may 
never be comfortable removing human involvement completely from the clinical predictive 
processes and therefore a human professional may need to be included.  
Overall, the results of the current study are encouraging as they suggest that an 
educational approach can assist in the implementation of simple actuarial tools – and the 
realization of the practical benefits associated with increased usage of those tools – in many real-
world decision contexts.  
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Appendix A 
A common symptom reported by emergency room patients is severe chest pain. Hospital staff 
must then categorize the patients’ risk level for having an actual heart attack. This categorization 
of risk is then used to make treatment decisions. This decision has very important implications 
for both the hospitals and patients. A hospital is considering a new procedure for making their 
categorization decisions. The details of the current procedure and the proposed new procedure 
are outlined below. 
Current Categorization Procedure 
The current procedure requires the hospital staff to collect approximately 50 pieces of 
information from each patient. This includes historical data (description of symptoms, family 
medical history, prescribed medications, etc.), a physical examination (blood pressure, chest 
tenderness, heart murmurs, etc.), and results from an electrocardiogram (EKG) test. An 
emergency room doctor reviews all this information. They then decide each patient’s risk level 
of having a heart attack. This decision is made intuitively, based on the doctor’s experience and 
training. The final treatment decision is based on the doctor’s categorization of risk. 
Proposed New Categorization Procedure 
The new procedure will require the hospital staff to collect 5 pieces of information from each 
patient. This includes two results from the EKG test, blood pressure, reported pain level, and 
lung sounds. This information will be entered into a computer-based statistical formula. The 
formula will calculate each patient’s risk level of having a heart attack. This formula was created 
by using the information that was important for predicting risk levels in previous patients. The 
final treatment decision will be based on the formula’s categorization of risk. 
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Appendix B 
A common event within prisons is an inmate applying to be released on parole. When an inmate 
applies for parole, prison staff must categorize the inmate’s risk level for engaging in future 
violent behavior. This categorization of risk is then used to make a decision of whether or not to 
grant parole to the inmate. This decision has very important implications for both the inmates 
and the general public. A prison is considering a new procedure for making their categorization 
decisions. The details of the current procedure and the proposed new procedure are outlined 
below. 
Current Categorization Procedure 
The current procedure requires the prison staff to collect approximately 120 pieces of 
information from each inmate. This includes information regarding personal factors (age, gender, 
etc.), historical factors (abused as a child, criminal history, etc.), situational factors (social 
support network, employment, etc.), and clinical factors (experiencing delusions, mental illness, 
etc.). A prison psychologist reviews all of this information. They then decide each inmate’s risk 
level of engaging in future violent behavior. This decision is made intuitively, based on the 
psychologist’s experience and training. The final parole decision is based on the psychologist’s 
categorization of risk. 
Proposed New Categorization Procedure 
The new procedure will require the prison staff to collect 12 pieces of information from each 
inmate. This includes information within the same four factors as the current procedure 
(personal, historical, situational, and clinical). This information will be entered into a computer-
based statistical formula. The formula will calculate each patient’s risk level of engaging in 
future violent behavior. This formula was created by using the information that was important 
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for predicting risk levels in previous inmates. The final parole decision will be based on the 
formula’s categorization of risk. 
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Footnotes 
1For Study 1 and Study 2, all participants who completed the surveys were included, and all 
measures, conditions, and data exclusions were reported. While sample size was not conducted a 
priori, post-hoc power analysis reveals that Study 1 had 85% power and Study 2 had 99% power. 
2A full list of variables and the associated coding dictionary for the open-ended responses in both 
Study 1 and Study 2 can be obtained from the corresponding author.  
 
 
